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Concepts of human beings as free ami morally responsible agents are shared culturally by scien-
tists and Christian theologians. Accimiplishments of the "artificial intelligence" (AI) branch ofccmi-
puter science now suggest the possibility of an advanced robot mimicking behaviors associated with
free and morally responsible agency. The author analyzes some specific features theology has expected
ofsuch agency, inquiring whether appropriate AI resources are available for incorporating the features
in robots. Waiving questions of whether such extraordinary robots will be constructed, the analysis
indicates that they could be, furnishing useful new scientific resources fir understanding moral agency.
Introduction
Implications of contemporary scientific
research have begun to provoke anxious ques-
tions among theologians and scientists regard-
ing basic notions of ourselves as free and
morally responsible agents. Representing
Christian philosophy, for example, Nancey
Murphy voices concern that "if mental events
can be reduced to brain events, and the brain
events are governed by the laws of neurology
(and uhimately by the laws of physics), then
in what sense can we say that humans have
free will?"' In the same volume, Malcolm
Jeeves amplifies Murphy's concerns by pos-
ing similar questions from a complementary
scientific perspective:
Since it would seem that everything that
happens at the level of mind is tightly
coupled with what is happening in a
physical system, the human brain, what
about notions of human freedom and
responsibility?'
Although the foregoing questions are well
motivated, they do not mention an important
contemporary science and technology that
should also be receiving attention. In particu-
lar, the subset of computer science known
generally as "artificial intelligence" (AI) is
now rapidly acquiring the hardware capabili-
ties it needs to begin mimicking intelligent
human behavior at seriously convincing lev-
els. The following remarks from recent is-
sues of popular news magazines serve to il-
lustrate corresponding expectations within the
AI community:
AI prophet Ray Kurzweil, the Massa-
chusetts-based inventor of pattern-
recognition technology, says that
computers will exceed human intelli-
gence no later than 2020.''
Could a robot ever really want
anything? The hard-core reductionists
among us, myself included, think that in
principle this must be possible. [...)
[Tlherc has been a renaissance of
interest in robots that walk like humans,
talk like humans, detect human faces
and have the beginnings of human
social responses. [...] |T]he direction is
clear: robots are becoming more
humanlike. Barring a complete failure
of the mechanistic view of life, these
endeavors will eventually lead to robots
to which we will want to extend the
same inalienable rights that humans
enjoy.^
Some initial critical comments about state-
ments of this sort seem appropriate. Experi-
ence with the real business of computer ap-
plication software development readily
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teaches one to view all claims regarding ca-
pabilities of future systems with caution.
More skeptical voices can also be heard out-
side the AI community. Regiirding "comput-
ers or computer-controlled robots," for ex-
ample, physicist Roger Penrose argues, "they
deserve no share of the blame when things go
wrong—that would always lie elsewhere!'"*
Speaking for both physics and theology, John
Polkinghorne assures us "we know, as surely
as we know anything, that we are not our-
selves automata."*" On the other hand, a few
factual and representative AI accomplish-
ments probably also ought to be acknowl-
edged at this point. In 1995, a robotic system
drove a Plymouth minivan from Washington,
D.C., to San Diego, California, "in control
98.2% of the time, at an average speed of over
100 km/h." ' In 1997, an AI chess playing
system (Deep Blue) "beat world chess cham-
pion Gary Kasparov."** Honda Motors of Ja-
pan has produced a humanlike robot with
"fully functional arms and camera eyes" that
is capable of "walking, on flat and sloped
ground, and up and down stairs." '^ In bal-
ance, something like the following modest
judgment seems intellectually fair at this time:
AI science and technok)gy appear to have ma-
tured sufficiently to be considered in the kinds
of discussions of free and morally responsible
agency we have initially illustrated with the
comments by Nancey Murphy and Malcolm
Jeeves. It should be reasonable to begin in-
vestigating the possible use of artificially in-
telligent systems as laboratories for explor-
ing traditional understandings of humanity.
In this essay, I furnish a limited investiga-
tion of this type, viewing notions of free and
morally responsible agency against a back-
ground of AI science and technology. As ac-
counts of some traditional concepts of human
freedom and moral responsibility are as-
sembled, associated features will be compared
with AI resources now available. To facili-
tate and focus such comparisons, the hypo-
thetical construct of an advanced robot
(named "Andrew") will be assumed. Typical
use of this construct will propose specific AI
resources that could be incorporated into An-
drew to realize identified features of moral
agency. In all cases, the objective will be re-
stricted to specifying AI resources that plau-
sibly could permit the robot to exhibit selected
features of moral agency. Explicit design pro-
posals, as well as response to the related ques-
tion of whether a robot of this type actually
will be constiTJcted, are not among the respon-
sibilities I have assumed in this essay.
Two additional observations may help
define the scope of this analysis. First, the
kinds of free and morally responsible agents
most often considered in theological discus-
sions are, understandably, human beings and
God. Paul Tillich. in his Systematic Theol-
ogy, suggests "freedom and destiny can be
applied to subhuman nature only by way of
analogy." '" Although I shall broadly be shar-
ing Tillich's notion of "analogy," exploring
principally the analogy of human freedom for
the particular "subhuman" case of a robot, it
will also become evident that considering the
special case of God's free agency cannot be
avoided in an investigation of this type. Sec-
ondly, all features of human freedom and
moral responsibility investigated here are to
be understood as operating at the agent level
of description. I shall not, for example, be
ascribing free will to individual neurons of
the human brain or to individual circuit ele-
ments of a robot. This is a convention with
ample support from the theological commu-
nity—as theologian Jonathan Edwards con-
cisely observed, "the will itself is not an agent
that has a will." "
Analysis
Convenient labels for several features
most regularly ascribed to morally responsible
agents in theological and related works are
the following:
• reason
• community
• awareness
• free will
Although this list is not exhaustive and its
simple labels will require some explanatory
expansion, it provides a useful outline for the
topics to be addressed.
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Reason
Defined even in the minimal sense ofcom-
prising a normal capability for logically cor-
rect ratiocination, reason has a long history
of being regarded as at least a necessary fea-
ture of any agent to whom we might properly
ascribe moral responsibility. In the thought
of Saint Thomas Aquinas, the "practical rea-
son," recognizing "the good as the end of hu-
man conduct," allows us to infer, as a guide
to moral choices of action, "good is to be done
and pursued."'^ Implicit in prescriptions of
this sort has been an additional assumption
the rational agent can recognize cases permit-
ting application of moral principles—an as-
sumption reflected in modern criminal law
with the so-called "M'Naghten rules," accord-
ing to which "a person has a defense of in-
sanity if he did not know the nature and qual-
ity of the act he was doing, or did not know
that it was wrong, because laboring under a
defect of reason from disease of the mind.""
Traditionally, then, both morally and legally
responsible agents have been expected to dis-
play a capability to recognize cases requiring
moral choice and to make reasoned judgments
As accounts ofsome traditional concepts of
human freedom and moral responsibility
are assembledy associatedfeatures will be
compared with AI resources now available.
To facilitate andfocus such comparisons^
the hypothetical construct ofan advanced
robot (named ^^Andrew^') will be assumed.
about those choices, relative to some moral
standards.
Neither of the foregoing requirements ap-
pears to present a technical challenge, in prin-
ciple, that should prevent our hypothetical
robot, Andrew, from achieving this much of
the status of a morally responsible agent.
Rule-based reasoning has been a staple of AI
technology for years, and statements of the
form "good is to be done and pursued" are
not unlike the global assertions knowledge
engineers typically elicit from "domain ex-
perts" in the course of their "knowledge ac-
quisition" work. Although the levels of ab-
straction found in words such as "good" un-
deniably could pose some difficulties for
knowledge representation in our robot, the
more serious practical difficulties in design
and development would be likely to involve
the task of equipping Andrew to recognize
situations requiring moral choices. Again,
however, there is an established AI technol-
ogy—case-based reasoning—that offers re-
sources appropriate for responding to the func-
tional requirement. To the extent morally re-
sponsible agents have traditionally been ex-
pected to exhibit the features of reason that
have been characterized, specific existing AI
resources appear sufficient for satisfying, in
a robot, at least this much of the requirement.
Community
Even when it is understood as nothing
more than a social group of interacting agents
sharing certain common characteristics, com-
munity can be recognized as a logically nec-
essary context for any meaningful discussion
. of morally responsible
behavior. Moreover,
any agent expected to
display responsible be-
havior within a com-
munity must possess at
least some set of el-
ementary capabilities
for relevant kinds of
social interaction.
Theologian H. Richard
Niebuhr, in The Re-
sponsible Self, identi-
fies several capabilities presumed by the "idea
or pattern of responsibility." '^ Functionally,
any agent satisfying Niebuhr "s analysis must
somehow be able to recognize itself as an
agent in community, interpret and respond to
actions by other agents, and formulate expec-
tations concerning the responsive behavior of
other agents. A broadly similar insight is ex-
pressed by theologian Paul Tillich in Mural-
itx and Beyond:
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The moral imperative is the command to
become what one potentially is, a person
within a community of persons." '^
Accordingly, the community feature of mor-
ally responsible agency—as it has been
viewed among theologians—would at least
challenge our hypothetical robot, Andrew, to
incoiporate some representation of himself as
an agent liable to certain kinds of interactions
with other agents.
sor Grosz. In any event, there appear to be
sufficiently clear parallels between theologi-
cal and AI notions about the community fea-
ture of responsible agents to make incorpora-
tion of this feature into Andrew a plausibly
realistic objective.
Awareness
Also known as "self' awareness, and un-
derstood as the passive aspect of normal hu-
Substantial AI re-
sources for such incor-
poration already exist.
"Distributed aHificial
intelligence" (DAI) is
an area characterized
by Nicholas Avouris
and Les Gasser as go-
ing "beyond the study
of individual 'intelli-
gent agents' solving
individual problems,
to consider problem
solving that has social components." "^ A spe-
cific example of such research is work led by
Professor Barbiua Grosz, at Harvard, on "Col-
laborative Planning and Human-Computer
Communication"; the work is described on
its website as "developing intelligent com-
puter 'agents' that work together in teams." '^
One element of DAI research that responds
most clearly to the challenges facing our hy-
pothetical robot is known as "agent model-
ing." Development of communities of inter-
acting artificially intelligent agents has re-
vealed the functional advantage of equipping
the agents with dynamic internal representa-
tions of themselves and other agents—i.e.,
with "agent models." As Avouris and Gasser
point out, one benefit of this technique is that
it "allows an agent to predict the behavior of
other agents" "*—a capability bearing remark-
able resemblance to the previously mentioned
observations by H. Richard Niebuhr, which
require a responsible agent to have "expecta-
tion of response to his response." ''^ Indeed, it
could well be the case that elements of
Niebuhr 's analysis should prove useful in AI
work of the sort being conducted by Profes-
/ have already identifiedAI resources that
might plausibly be applied to furnish the
reason and communityfeatures required
of a morally responsible agent. Now
come challengesfrom theology and law to
equip this hypothetical robot also with
awareness.
man consciousness, awareness presents a regu-
larly assuined feature of morally responsible
agency that is qualitatively different from those
already considered. John Polkinghorne has
displayed appreciation of this point, observ-
ing that "in self-consciousness we are getting
close to the centre of the mystery of
personhood." " Although legal responsibil-
ity is strictly not identical with moral respon-
sibility, a compatible view may be found in
comments by Hyman Gross concerning legal
grounds for excuse from criminal liability.
Specifically, Gross takes these grounds to in-
clude "separation of consciousness and action
such as exists during hypnosis, somnambu-
lism, and epileptic seizures."-' I have already
identified AI resources that might plausibly be
applied to furnish the reason and community
features required of a morally responsible
agent. Now coine challenges from theology
and law to equip this hypothetical robot also
with awareness—certainly not the kind of
functional requirement normally encountered
in the business of computer systems engineer-
ing! How might a practitioner of AI science
and technology respond to this challenge?
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One helpful clue toward an answer was
suggested years ago by AI pioneer John
McCarthy; his general prescription is el-
egantly concise:
To ascribe certain 'beliefs', 'knowl-
edge', 'free will', 'intentions', 'con-
sciousness', 'abilities', or 'wants' to a
machine or computer program is
legitimate when such an ascription
expresses the same infomiation about
the machine that it expresses about a
person.-'
Following McCarthy's advice, one is led to
ask exactly what can ever be known about a
person that one might attempt to express re-
garding that person's consciousness. Consid-
ered rigorously as a question about direct
knowledge of the other person's subjective
experience, it should seem that the honest
answer is "nothing." But surely, one might
object, an experienced neurologist—having
worked for years with patients showing nu-
merous types of neurological disorders spe-
cifically affecting consciousness—would be
more brave about drawing inferences from be-
havior regarding a patient's awareness! Alas,
Antonio Damasio, a neurologist with just such
credentials, says:
The idea that the nature of subjective
experiences can be grasped effectively
by the study of their behavioral
correlates is wrong.-'
Damasio is doubly relevant to the topic at
hand, for he has also offered explicit opin-
ions, in The Feeling ofWhat Happens, on the
question of consciousness in artifacts of the
kind under discussion. Although he believes
"we have little chance of creating an artifact
with anything that resembles human con-
sciousness, conceptualized from an inner-
sense perspective," Damasio acknowledges
that "we can create artifacts with the formal
mechanisms of consciousness proposed in this
book, and it may be possible to say those arti-
facts have some kind of consciousness"—in
fact, he recognizes that "external behaviors
of artifacts with formal mechanistns of con-
sciousness will mimic conscious behaviors
and may pass a consciousness version of the
Turing test." -^
Although Damasio does not work profes-
sionally in the field ofAl (and makes no claim
of this kind), it is my opinion that many indi-
viduals with AI expertise could accept his
conclusions. Much of the argument he de-
velops in The Feeling ofWhat Happens may
broadly be described as directed toward
showing that the human brain can form
(physical) representations of the self (qua
individual organism) as well as interactions
of the self with an environment that includes
other selves. To this extent, he describes a
general task of representation that could, in
principle, be served by types of AI resources
we have already reviewed (e.g., case-based
reasoning and DAI). His additional insistence
that—in effect—no amount of behavioral evi-
dence can prove the presence of awareness
in an agent is essentially a philosophical po-
sition that the present author endorses (but
cannot, in this limited venue, undertake de-
fending). Applying the philosophic position
to a question already posed, however, reveals
an interesting result. Waiving possible argu-
ments regarding telepathic phenomena, one
strictly knows nothing about the awareness
of persons or robots; hence, (returning to the
language of John McCarthy's advice) the le-
gitimacy of ascribing awareness to a ma-
chine—relative to information one actually
can express about the machine—is no more
dubious than the legitimacy of ascribing
awareness to a person.
On the other hand, an important additional
observation concerns the way people are ac-
tually likely to respond to robots exhibiting
convincing mimicry of human behaviors that
are normally taken to reflect the presence of
awareness. This pragmatic point is illustrated
in remarks by roboticist Hans Moravec, who
argues—for "robots that are properly commu-
nicative"—most people will interpret the ar-
tifacts as possessing "thoughts and beliefs and
feelings," quite regardless of "how they in-
ternally achieve the behavior." -"^ How, then,
might an AI practitioner respond to the chal-
lenge to equip Andrew with awareness? The
answer recommended in the present discus-
sion may be summarized in the following
propositions:
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• No behavioral evidence may be expected
ever to prove (or disprove) Andrew has
achieved awareness.
• Plausibly achievable ("humanlike") be-
havior may be expected to persuade many
people to treat Andrew as an agent with awiue-
ness.
Free will
"Free will" is probably the one expression
most commonly associated with the notion of
a morally responsible agent, and writers in the
Christian theological tradition consistently
recognize it as a feature of human agents that
uniquely links them to God. Jonathan
Edwards, for example, describes human free
"capacity of choice" with the comment,
"herein does very much consist that image of
God wherein he made man." -" Similarly,
theologian Daniel Migliore notes that modern
interpreters "have emphasized human freedom
as the meaning of the image of God." -^ Free
will, as a feature of morally responsible hu-
man agency, has clearly been assigned a sta-
tus of singular importance in Christian theol-
ogy.
The prospects of incorporating free will
'in an advanced robot such as Andrew appear
to be a function of how "free will" is defined
—
and, on this point, the religious community dis-
plays some divergence. A concept that regu-
larly generates the differences is the notion of
determinism. Elements of this notion, in turn,
characteristically include requirements—as
suggested by Gerald Dworkin—that a deter-
mined event be "causally necessitated," have
a "sufficient explanation in causal tenns" and
be "in principle predictable." -'^ Applying this
concept to agents who are claimed to be exer-
cising "free will" as they make moral choices,
two different definitions of the agent's free-
dom have historically been distinguished by
their treatment of detemiinism. First, follow-
ing the common temiinology used by Malcolm
Jeeves, a "compatibilist" definition of freedom
may be identified (endorsing so-called "lib-
erty of spontaneity") as any definition that is
compatible with the agent's moral choices
being subject to determinism.-'' Secondly, a
contrasting definition of freedom—associated
with the expressions "liberty of indifference"
and "libertarian view of freedom"—is repre-
sented in any definition that is not compat-
ible with the agent's moral choices being sub-
ject to determinism.^" One can recognize the
outlines of two very different kinds of chal-
lenge being placed by these contrasting defi-
nitions of "free will" against the resources of
AI science and technology. I shall now ex-
amine them in succession, beginning with the
compatibilist position.
Representing the substantial theological
tradition known as Calvinism, Jonathan
Edwards furnishes particularly clear illustra-
tions of compatibilist views. The following
comment from Edwards' Freedom oftlie Will
is a concise expression of his basic position:
Let the person come by his volition or
choice how he will, yet, ii" he is able,
and there is nothing in the way to
hinder his pursuing and executing his
will, the man is fully and perfectly free,
according to the primary and common
notion of freedom.^'
Indeed, modem scientific understanding of the
human brain was essentially unavailable to
Edwards; nevertheless, it may be reasonably
inferred that he should not have been likely
to share the worries Nancey Murphy was ini-
tially found to express—concerning potential
reduction of "mental events" to "brain
events"—even if the pertinent scientific in-
formation had been supplied.
Turning now to the corresponding chal-
lenge of identifying resources of AI science
and technology that might be incorporated in
Andrew to give this hypothetical robot a
compatibilist version of free will, what one
discovers is rather surprising. Relieved of all
concern about determinism, AI engineers
should be free to employ any appropriate tech-
nique—such as rule-based reasoning, artifi-
cial neural networks, or case-based reason-
ing—that would plausibly contribute to
Andrew's capabilities for "humanlike" moral
choice behavior. In fact, the compatibilist
position just might pose a more serious prob-
lem for theology than it does for AI. Would
Jonathan Edwards, for example, really still be
comfortable asserting, "Let the robot come by
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his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is
able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder
his pursuing and executing his will, the robot
is fully and perfectly free!"
Not everyone, of course, has been satis-
fied with the compatibilist position.
Jonathan Edwards was quite aware of this,
arguing against "Amiinians, Pelagians and
others [who] oppose the Calvinists [and view
human liberty] as opposed to all necessity,
or any fixed and certain connection with
some previous ground or reason." ^^ Extreme
versions of this alternative view—as
Alasdair Maclntyre has pointed out, for the
case of S0ren Kierkegaard—may be subject
to internal logical problems; given the
"Kierkegaardian concept of choice" as
"criterionless," it is difficult to explain how
"one choice can be more correct than an-
other."" Indeed, if one is already uncom-
fortable about ascribing free will to the com-
puter-based reasoning of a robot, being told,
"That's OK—we'll design Andrew to roll
dice when he faces any moral decision."
should hardly be enough to make the robot
seem morally responsible. On the other
hand, it has been argued by philosopher J. J.
C. Smart that the strategy of seeking an ac-
count of free will rejecting both determin-
ism and randomness may be likened to de-
fining "a new sort of natural number, a 'free'
number, as one which is neither prime nor
divisible by a number which is greater than
one and smaller than itself." ^^ The direc-
tion of Smart's argument has critical impli-
cations for the current topic. If it is the case
that free will must be either deteniiinistic or
random, and neither disjunctive choice al-
lows meaningful moral responsibility, then
neither theologians nor AI engineers can
have a coherent concept of morally respon-
sible agent with free will to engage. I sug-
gest that this is not the case, and feel obliged
to propose a "better way" to interpret the is-
sues in dispute.
Opponents of the compatibilist position-
as Smart also acknowledges—need not all be
accused of offering the absurd alternative
claim "we are responsible for those of our
actions which are due to pure chance." " In-
stead, what one typically finds in their argu-
ments is rejection of particular types of deter-
minism, some examples of which may be de-
scribed in the following manner: (1) deter-
minism that is reductive, (2) determinism that
is blind to the distinction between possibility
and actuality, and (3) determinism that insists
on total predictability. Although they would
disagree with a general assertion that deter-
minism is compatible with free will, these
critics are more precisely described as dis-
agreeing with assertions that certain types of
determinism are compatible with free will. I
shall now examine, in succession, each of
these cases.
Opponents of reductive determinism tend
not to dispute scientific accounts of lawful
bodily operations, such as neural activity, but
rather to resist "reductionist" explanations of
the choices we make as persons. Nancey
Murphy, for example, has argued at length
against "causal reductionism," ending with the
conjecture that "a positive account of how free
will is embodied in neurological functioning"
should come from "appreciating the multiple
interacting layers of information processing
in the brain."" ''' Similarly, John Polkinghome
develops the notion of a "downward causa-
tion,"" of the kind involved "when we will the
movement of our arm,"" insisting "every level
of description may impose its own organiz-
ing pattern upon the flexibility of what can
occur." " These illustrative comments reflect
a basic awareness that we examine and un-
derstand our world at different so-called "lev-
els of description."" Implications of this in-
sight tend to embarrass reductive enterprises
such as attempts to explain personal moral
choices exclusively in terms of the laws of
physics, encouraging multilevel interpreta-
tions of complex systems.
Multilevel thinking "conies naturally'" in
the domain of computer science. We find
computer science professor Douglas
Hofstadter, for example, expressing thoughts
remarkably like those of Nancey Murphy,
John Polkinghorne and their colleagues:
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My belief is lliat the explanations of
"emergent" phenomena in our brains
—
for instance, ideas, hopes, images,
analogies, and finally consciousness
and free will—are based on a kind of
Strange Loop, an interaction between
levels in which the top level reaches
back down towards the bottom level
and inOuences it, while at the same time
being itself determined by the bottom
level.'**
Being card-carrying members of the
computer science community. AI engineers
and roboticists should be no less disposed
than Hofstadter to recognize what he de-
scribes as "causes that propagate both up-
wards and downwards" in multilevel sys-
tems.^*^ Accordingly, they should be com-
fortable defending our hypothetical robot,
Andrew, with ideas now found both in com-
puter science and theology. Critics of An-
drew might complain, "This robot has no free
will—his moral choices are determined
merely by the physical operation of his cir-
cuitry." Andrew's designers should be ex-
pected to reply, "His moral choices are
emerging through interactions of high-level
software representations of his moral prin-
ciples and low-level sensor inputs revealing
his situation. All of this certainly does hap-
pen to get realized in the operation of his
circuitry, but that's not what is under dis-
cussion here—an exhaustive account of all
the electronic activity in Andrew does not
tell us what he is doing." (hi fairness, it
seems, the robot should deserve at least as
much defense against "causal reductionism"
as his human counterparts.)
The foregoing reference to a type of de-
terminism that is "blind to the distinction be-
tween possibility and actuality" is a nonstand-
ard labeling that warrants some preliminary
explanation. The explanation, in turn, begins
with some briefcomments regarding theoreti-
cal physics. So-called "Laplacian determin-
ism" has rather been a benchmark concept of
detenninism since it was enunciated by eigh-
teenth-century mathematician Pierre Simon de
Laplace. It is a detenninism correspondingly
innocent of the twentieth-century revelation,
from tiuantum theory, that it is impossible to
obtain the information about simultaneous
positions and momenta required to describe a
"clockwork universe" in which successive
states of macroscopic physical systems are
precisely defined and predicted. Although at
least one respected scientist accordingly iden-
tifies quantum mechanics as "the graveyard
of determinism," ^" it does not immediately
follow that all manner of determinism has
vanished from physics. A first note of cau-
tion in this regard is sounded by Roger
Penrose, in Sfuukm's of the Mind, with this
observation:
It is not Cardano's probability theory
that operates at the quantum level,
despite the common opinion that the
quantum world is a probabilistic world.
Instead, it is his mysterious theory of
complex numbers that underlies a
mathematically precise and probability-
free description of the quantum level of
activity.'*'
Penrose proceeds to explain that, although
superpositions of states may be alien to ev-
eryday experience, the (Schrodinger) equa-
tions describing evolution of this strange "mi-
cro-world" yield a "description that is indeed
mathematically precise and, moreover, com-
pletely deteniiinistic!"^- Recognizing that
some scientists^' hold an inteipretation of
quantum theory under whicft the Schrodinger
equations describe a world of (superimposed)
possibilities (with quantum measurement re-
vealing the world of actualities), the deter-
minism mentioned by Penrose may be iden-
tified as a determinism that is sensitive to the
distinction between possibility and actuality.
In contrast, it is specifically Laplacian deter-
minism that is "blind" to this discrimination.
The distinction between possibility and ac-
tuality appears also to be a feature of pro-
cess theology. Whatever its exact relation to
quantum physics, process theology clearly
is not consistent with Laplacian detenninism
and views free moral choices as a "wedge of
novelty"^"* or a "creative advance into nov-
elty"^'' that maps possibility into actuality.
A third type of determinism, insisting
upon total predictability—that is, predictabil-
ity for all cases—is also rejected by some as
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a determinism compatible with free will. John
Polkinghorne draws attention—in Science
and Providence—to macroscopic "complex
dynamical systems" that display "a delicate
sensitivity to circumstance which makes them
intrinsically unpredictable," afl'ording us "the
prospect of describing a world in which we
(and God) have freedom to act." ^'' For the
specific case of nonlinear dynamical systems.
Relieved of all concern about determinism^
AI engineers should be free to employ any
appropriate technique—such as rule-
based reasoningy artificial neural networks,
or case-based reasoning—that would plau-
sibly contribute to Andrew's capabilities for
''humanlike^' moral choice behavior.
at least, Polkinghorne may be overstating un-
certainties somewhat by claiming "The fu-
ture is no longer contained in the past" ^^;
mathematical equations describing systems
of this kind do offer an in-principle determin-
ism, although practical ignorance of their ini-
tial conditions typically makes the systems
in practice unpredictable. Nevertheless, his
recognition that authentic freedom calls for
something less than a determinism yielding
perfect predictability is clearly shared by
computer scientist Douglas Hofstadter.
Hofstadter reaches the conclusion, however,
by a somewhat different path. He begins a
thought experiment involving several kinds
of systems (including a robot) with the sug-
gestion, "By carefully groping for what we
really mean when we choose to describe a
system—mechanical or biological—as being
capable of making 'choices,' I think we can
shed much light on free will."^** His thought
experiment eventually progresses to the case
of a chess-playing robot equipped with a lim-
ited ability to monitor the processes result-
ing in its own choices. Hofstadter then of-
fers the following interesting observation
about this case:
[T]his program does monitor itself and
does have ideas about its ideas—but il
cannot monitor its own processes in
complete detail, and therefore has a sort
of intuitive sense of its workings,
without full understanding. From this
balance between self-knowledge and
self-ignorance comes the feeling offree
will.'"
If one replaces Hofstadter's stipulation
that the robot "cannot monitor its own pro-
P cesses in complete de-
tail" with the notion that
it finds its choices "in
practice unpredictable,"
one discovers a striking
resemblance between
the insights of Hofstadter
and Polkinghorne. The
computer scientist's
thought experiment adds
an assertion, though, that
seems somewhat more
' illuminating—from a
"balance between self-knowledge and self-ig-
norance" comes our "feeling of free will." In-
deed, if our own moral choices were found to
be unpredictable in practice because their
bases were altogether inscrutable, any claims
of moral responsibility should be difficult to
maintain.
If an AI engineer were called upon to de-
sign an advanced robot incorporating the two
requirements of free will just described—that
is, a free will consistent with moral choices
we feel are mapping us from possibilities into
actualities, through processes we only partly
understand—which available AI resources
might be prescribed? Fuzzy logic technol-
ogy should be expected to figure prominently
in the answer, for it satisfies both require-
ments. Systems using fuzzy logic typically
combine rules in symbolic form (e.g., "If
charity's need is great and my resources are
ample, then my contribution should be large")
with more opaque computations (e.g., deter-
mination of centroids during defuzzification).
In this sense, fuzzy logic systems inherently
furnish support for modeling the "balance be-
tween self-knowledge and self-ignorance"
prescribed by Hofstadter. Fuzzy logic sys-
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tems also are structurally suitable for model-
ing mappings of possibilities into actuality.
It is a distinguishing property of fuzzy logic
inference systems that multiple rules can con-
tribute to each inference (unlike bivalent logic
systems, in which only one rule is selected
for "firing"). This means that contradictory
conditions can be considered during compu-
tation of each conclusion—a property inher-
ently suited for modeling realms of possibili-
ties, as well as the paradoxical superpositions
found in quantum mechanics. It should be
acknowledged that a potential objection to the
use of large fuzzy logic systems—of the sort
we should expect in an advanced robot such
as Andrew— is the enormous size of the mle
sets they could entail. Modular design of the
rule sets can substantially relieve this prob-
lem,"*" although it could remain a limitation
of some importance on implementation scale.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis of free and mor-
ally responsible agency, as it has been under-
stood in theological communities and others
closely related, addressed four fundamental
features of the concept—reason, community,
awareness and free will. In each case, com-
parison of these features with available AI
resources revealed no obstacles, in principle,
to their future incorporation in an advanced
robot (although some possible scale limita-
tions upon fuzzy logic inference systems were
acknowledged). Traditional accounts of the
examined features, therefore, appear gener-
ally to be translatable into elements ofA I sci-
ence and technology.
Jesus repeatedly asked his disciples "Who
do you say I am?" (e.g., Mark 8:29). Results
from this essay are an invitation to envision
the robot Andrew asking a different but simi-
lar kind of question: "What do you say I am?"
Would human beings comfortably answer that
Andrew is a free and morally responsible
agent if he can convincingly pass a special
version of the Turing test—one specifically
tailored to include behavioral criteria based
on the foregoing analysis? If he is denied this
status, how might this response be explained?
In either case, artificial intelligence already
furnishes the technical vocabulary and labo-
ratory resources identified in this essay for ex-
pressing and experimentally supporting the
answers given. Moreover, it can be reason-
ably expected that work with AI methods
should occasionally illumine traditional theo-
logical views—it is, after all, a venerable les-
son of computer science that one very reliable
way to understand something thoroughly is to
try simulating it in software. In sum, there
are good reasons to believe artificial intelli-
gence can help theologians and scientists ad-
vance their understandings of free moral
agency.
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